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NOTES
pany twenty years ago, followed by disintegration into many
smaller units, to the control of the industry by several very large
companies. Furthermore, while twenty years ago the Standard
Company was responsible for approximately 80 per cent of the
refined products, today, the separate Standard companies in the
aggregate control almost 25 per cent of the crude production and
approximately 45 per cent of the output of refined products.
About half of the crude is still produced by a very large number
of individuals or small companies, but more than two-thirds of
the "proven acreage" of oil bearing lands of the country is in
the hands of nine Standard Companies and six independent
companies.
A consideration of the facts summarized heretofore may be an
aid to the formulation of some plan for stabilization. The plans
which have been suggested by various authorities are too numer-
ous and involved to be considered here. A brief study of some
of these plans, which may be found in recent volumes of the
Congressional Record and in other governmental documents, law
journals, periodicals and treatises, will disclose that most of the
solutions center their attention on the production end of the
industry. From the economic standpoint, however, it would
seem that possibly more effective control might be exercised
through the refiners who are fewer in number. A national plan
for cooperation among them would transcend irrelevant state
lines. The resulting lack of a market for excess production of
crude might well induce a voluntary control in the oil fields,
which militia are now being used to enforce sporadically. The
necessary revision of the anti-trust laws and the establishment
of suitable regulation over a consoltdated petroleum industry
constitute a major challenge to statesmanship.
H. ROBERT SHAMPAINE, '32.
CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY OF DEFECTIVELY
ORGANIZED CORPORATIONS
The approach to the problem of the judicial treatment of de-
fectively organized corporations is one hedged about by many
conflicting ideas and many concurrent considerations of which
notice must be taken.' First of all it may be said that from the
I The following factors must be considered: the nature of the body which
has presumably been brought into existence; for what purpose the question
of corporate existence is being urged; the nature of the defect in the cor-
porate structure, and whether or not the particular defects are regarded in
that jurisdiction as supermandatory, mandatory or merely directory re-
Washington University Open Scholarship
ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
standpoint of organization, corporations can be divided into two
all-inclusive categories, invulnerable corporations, 2 properly,
carefully and correctly organized, on the one hand, and defective
corporations on the other hand. Of the latter class there are
many types varying from de facto corporations to "naked" asso-
ciations according to the quality of their defectiveness, and it
can be said safely that the difference between them is largely a
matter of degree.
Where there is defectiveness of incorporation the courts are
put to the task of deciding whether or not a de facto corporation
has been brought into existence. The definition of a de facto
corporation which is now commonly accepted by the text-writers
and one followed by the courts in this country involves three
requisites: a statute or general law under which such a corpora-
tion might exist, a bona fide attempt under that law and a color-
able compliance therewith, and finally the exercise of corporate
powers or "user" as it is called.3 It is the second requisite that
has become the bone of contention. When is the defect such that
there has been a failure to make a colorable compliance with the
law? This question has met with a variable response from the
courts. It is essentially upon this ground that the nature of the
defective corporation is determined. 4 Thus it might be well to
advert to a brief survey of the treatment accorded the more
prevalent defects in corporate organization.
(a) The failure to file a certificate of corporate existence
It has been held that the filing of a certificate is a condition
precedent to the existence of a de jure corporation and as to this
quirements; special statutory provisions covering specific instances, and
what is not the least confusing of all, the meaning to b6 implied from the
language of the opinions and the influences upon the court of considerations
of public policy.
2Invulnerable corporations are intended to designate those corporations
which, so far as their original incorporation goes, would be safe from dis-
solution by the state on direct attack.
3 There are cases which demand only the existence of a statute, and the
user of corporate powers. Methodist-Episcopal Union Church v. Pickett
(1859) 19 N. Y. 391. But this case has been severely criticised. Society of
Perun v. City of Cleveland (1885) 43 Ohio St. 481, 33 N. E. 357; Finnegan
v. Noerenberg (1893) 52 Minn. 239, 53 N. W. 1150; Von Lezerke v. City of
New York (1912) 150 App. Div. 98, 134 N. Y. S. 832; Ballantine, MANUAL
OF CoRPoRATIoN LAW (1930) 77, n. 19; Warren, Collateral Attack (1906)
20 HARV. L. REv. 454.
4 It is obvious that the user of corporate powers will not be often called
into question, because it is the attempt to use corporate powers in the ab-
sence of taking proper legal steps to secure such right that brings about
litigation. If the state does not sanction the existence of corporations for the
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point there is little difficulty. 5 However, where the statute re-
quires filing in more than one place the failure to file in each
place does not prevent the formation of a de facto corporation if
there has been an attempt to comply as evidenced by filing in
one of the places specified. 6 Some cases without determining
whether or not there is a de facto corporation say that one is
estopped to deny the corporate existence.7 There is a respectable
number of cases expounding the contrary view to the effect that
a failure to file defeats corporate existence.8 Here, too, many of
the opinions do not indicate clearly whether or not a de facto
corporation is meant. In some states there are statutes which
declare that "a corporation shall have no legal existence" or "a
corporation shall not transact business" if certificates have not
been duly filed. These, likewise, have received various treat-
ment.9
purpose involved, etc., so that no law exists under which the corporatio l
can be formed, it is clear that there can be no corporate existence. Warren,
op. cit.
5 Bank of Midland v. Harris (1914) 114 Ark. 344, 170 S. W. 67; Hilton
v. Mackey (1912) 225 Ill. 144, 99 N. E. 470; Martin v. Deetz (1894) 102
Cal. 55, 36 Pac. 368.
6 Wesco Supply Co. v. Smith (1918) 134 Ark. 23, 203 S. W. 6; Bakers-
field Town Hall Ass'n v. Chester (1880) 55 Cal. 98; Hudson v. Green Hill
Seminary Co. (1885) 113 11. 618; Bushnell v. Consolidated Ice Mach. Co.
(1891) 138 Ill. 67, 27 N. E. 596; Marshall v. Keatch (1907) 227 Ill. 35, 81
N. E. 29; Galvin v. Detroit Steering Wheel Corp. (1913) 176 Mich. 569, 142
N. W. 742; Grant Chrome Co. v. Marks (1919) 92 Ore. 443, 181 Pac. 345.
Some cases hold that failure to file with the secretary of state is a matter
between the state and the corporation. United States v. Delatour (C. C. A.
8, 1921) 275 F. 137; Mokelumne Canal Min. Co. v. Woodruff (1859) 14 Cal.
424; Stone v. Great Western Oil Co. (1866) 41 Ill. 85; Doty v. Patterson
(1900) 155 Ind. 60, 56 N. E. 688; Humphrey v. Mooney (1880) 5 Colo.
282; Newcomb-Endicott v. Fee (1911) 167 Mich. 574, 133 N. W. 540; In re
Cordova Shop (D. C. W. D. N. Y. 1914) 216 F. 818.
7 Baker v. Neff (1880) 73 Ind. 68; Broadwell v. Merritt (1885) 87 Mo.
95, 1 S. W. 855; Rienhard v. Virginia Lead Mine Co. (1891) 107 Mo. 616, 18
S. W. 17; Roll v. St. L. & C. Co. (1892) 52 Mo. App. 60.
9 Elgin Watch Co. v. Loveland (C. C. N. D. Iowa 1904) 132 F. 41; Har-
rill v. Davis (C. C. A. 8, 1909) 168 F. 187; Perrine v. Levin (1910) 68 Misc.
327, 123 N. Y. S. 1007; McClennan v. Hopkins (1895) 2 Kan. App. 260, 42
Pac. 1061; Eisfeld v. Kinworth (1879) 50 Iowa 389; Guckert v. Hacke
(1893) 159 Pa. 313, 2 Atl. 249; Bergeron v. Hobbs (1897) 96 Wis. 641,
71 N. W. 1056.
9 Harrod v. Hamer (1873) 32 Wis. 162, expresses the view that although
the statute provides that the corporation shall not do business until the
certificates have been filed, the statute recognizes by its very wording
that the corporation does exist prior to this. See Granby Min. & Smel. Co.
v. Richards (1888) 95 Mo. 106, 8 S. W. 246. For treatment of statutes to
this effect see, Badger Paper Co. v. Rose (1897) 95 Wis. 145, 70 N. W. 302;
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(b) Failure to subscribe capital stock
There seems to be a clear weight of authority in favor of the
protection of members from individual liability where the capital
stock has not been fully subscribed. And correlatively the courts
will frequently enforce such liability to the extent of the amount
subscribed by the stockholderlo Upon principle it seems just
to enforce liability to this extent, since, as is said in a recent
Tennessee case, "Capital in the form of paid in stock is the sub-
stitute for personal liability.""' There are, however, a number
of decisions which reach a partnership result.12 In several cases
it should be noted there are statutes which impose this liability.18
But some courts have protected members despite statutory pro-
visions that at first blush would seem to impose partnership re-
sponsibility.14 Although many of the decisions do not categorize
business organizations involved as de facto or otherwise, it is
tacitly understood from the imposition of partnership liability
that the existence of a corporation de facto is being denied. The
factual point upon which the cases diverge is the time at which
the subscription comes, i. e., whether the subscription is made
after the assumption of corporate business or prior to incor-
approved in Sentinel Co. v. Meiselbach Co. (1910) 144 Wis. 224, 128 N. W.
861; Newel River Draining Ass'n v. Durbin (1868) 30 Ind. 173.20 Sweeney Brothers v. Talcott (1892) 85 Iowa 103, 52 N. W. 106; Thorn-
ton v. Baclon (1892) 85 Iowa 198, 52 N. W. 190; Moe v. Harris (1919) 142
Minn. 442, 172 N. W. 494; Crouch v. Gray (1926) 154 Tenn. 521, 290 S. W.
391; Tonge v. Item Pub. Co. (1914) 244 Pa. 417, 91 Atl. 229; Gartside Coal
Co. v. Maxwell (C. C. E. D. Mo. 1884) 22 F. 197; Planters & M. Bank v.
Padgett (1882) 69 Ga. 159; Jessup v. Carnegie (1880) 80 N. Y. 441; Mora-
wetz, CoRPoRATIoNs (1886) 748.
-. Eastern Prod. Corp. v. Tenn. Coal & Iron Co. (1925) 151 Tenn. 239,
269 S. W. 4. It may be noted here that there was only $800 paid in to-
ward a capitalization of $2,000,000.
12 Ward-Truitt Co. v. Bryan (1916) 144 Ga. 769, 87 S. E. 1037; Schaub
v. Coffin (1904) 135 Mich. 435, 97 N. W. 968; Swietusch v. Becker (1913)
153 Wis. 213, 140 N. W. 1056; Meyer v. Brunson (1916) 104 S. C. 84, 88
S. E. 359; Kaiser v. Lawrence Say. Bank (1881) 56 Iowa 104, 8 N. W. 772.13 Farners Co-op. Co. v. Floyd (1890) 47 Ohio St. 252, 26 N. E. 110;
Wechselberg v. Flour City Nat. Bank (C. C. A. 7, 1894) 64 F. 90 (statute
prohibited doing business). Loverin v. McLaughlin (1896) 161 Ill. 417, 44
N. E. 99; Kent v. Clark (1899) 181 Ill. 237, 54 N. E. 167; Chicago Coated
Bed Co. v. Bear (1911) 166 111. App. 258; Heinze v. South Green Bay Sand
& Dock Co. (1901) 109 Wis. 99, 85 N. W. 145 (statute prescribed liability
expressly).
14 American Radiator Co. v. Kinnear (1909) 56 Wash. 210, 105 Pac. 630;
McKay v. Garman (1915) 89 Wash. 23; 153 Pac. 1082; Nat'l Bank v. Almy(1875) 117 Mass. 476; Quinn v. Woods (1929) 134 Miss. 621, 99 So. 510.
In the Almy case the statute prescribed that there be no exercise of corpo-
rate powers until the capital stock was paid in.
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poration.15 Furthermore the lack of subscribed or paid in capi-
tal stock is sometimes looked to in determining the presence of a
bona fide attempt to incorporate.1 6
(c) Expiration of the charter
It may seem illogical to consider a corporation which has be-
come defective because of the expiration of its charter in the
same category with corporations which are defective at their
very inception by reason of defects in organization. But since
all these defects raise similar problems, it may be well to con-
sider briefly the treatment which the courts have accorded the
type of defect arising out of the expiration of the corporate
charter.
Some courts, in this situation, treat the corporation as de
facto.' 7 However other courts reach the contrary result.'8 It is
submitted that the former is the more just and desirable result,
except in those cases where the statute expressly forbids a longer
term of existence.' 9
This brief prefatory review of the authorities indicates that
little hope may be held for the crystallization of a general rule
as to what constitutes colorable compliance. It follows conse-
quently that there is no universal yard-stick by which corpora-
tions may be judged to determine whether or not they are de
facto entities. Each set of circumstances presents a specific
situation and the problem may be resolved by a reference to the
holdings of the particular jurisdiction in which the case arises.
If it is entitled to de facto status, the corporation can sue and be
sued, no collateral attack will be permitted, and the stockholders
will not be liable as partners. But if the organization does not
'5 Ballantine, op. cit. 89.
"a Christian Co. v. Fruitdale Lumber Co. (1898) 121 Ala. 340, 25 Ala.
340, 25 So. 566. Liability is sometimes based on fraud. Detroit Electric
Works v. Riverside St. Ry. Co. (Mo. 1895) 29 S. W. 412; Burns v. Beck
Hdwe. Co. (1889) 83 Ga. 471, 10 S. E. 121; cf. Wakeman v. Daley (1872) 51
N. Y. 27.
17 Miller v. Newbury Orrel Coal Co. (1888) 31 W. Va. 836, 8 S. E. 600;
Citizens Bank v. Jones (1903) 117 Wis. 446, 94 N. W. 329; Campbell v.
Perth Amboy Shipbuilding Co. (1905) 70 N. J. Eq. 40, 62 Atl. 319; Merges
v. Altenbrand (1912) 45 Mont. 355, 123 Pac. 21; Wilson v. Brown (1919)
107 Misc. 167, 175 N. Y. S. 688.
I Screwmans Benev. Ass'n v. Monteleone (La. 1929) 123 So. 116; Knight
of Pythias v. Weller (1896) 93 Va. 605, 25 S. E. 891; Bradley v. Reppell
(1896) 133 Mo. 545, 32 S. W. 645; Clarke v. American Cannel Coal Co.
(1905) 165 Ind. 213, 73 N. E. 1083; Bonfils v. Hayes (1921) 70 Colo. 336,
201 Pac. 677; Meramec Springs Park v. Gibson (1916) 268 Mo. 394, 188
S. W. 178.
1 Ballantine, op. cit. 85.
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merit de facto existence what then? As has been indicated,
many of the courts refuse to permit a suit in the name of the
pseudo-corporation and impose partnership liability; neverthe-
less many cases achieve a corporate result despite the failure to
acquire a de facto standing. This is done by the so-called "ap-
plication of the doctrine of estoppel. ' ' 20
In applying the estoppel doctrine to cases involving con-
tractual liability, the decisions may be divided into three
groups:21
(a) cases in which the purported corporation is seeking to es-
cape liability by denying its corporate existence;
(b) cases in which persons who have dealt with the corporation
as such seek to escape liability to the plaintiff corporation
by denying its corporate existence;
(c) cases in which the party having dealt with the corporation
seeks to impose liability upon the stockholders personally
by a denial of the corporate existence.
The first class of cases alluded to above presents the only situa-
tion in which there is a true estoppel.22 Here the corporation has
been held out to the plaintiff as such. Assuming that he is ig-
norant of actual facts, he has relied upon this representation
and has changed his position whereby he will be damaged if the
corporate existence is successfully refuted. The majority of de-
cisions hold to this view.23
2o As will appear later, there is only one type of case in which the estop-
pel is a real estoppel in pais. Furthermore the language of estoppel has
sometimes been used in denying collateral attack against a de facto corpo-
ration. See Bash v. Culver (1893) 7 Wash. 122, 34 Pac. 462. It may be
noted that effect of failure to acquire de facto status upon contractual lia-
bility is not consistent with the results in other classes of cases where the
liability question is not involved, for instance in matters of title of real
estate it is very difficult to raise the question of defectiveness of a corpora-
tion which is the vendor in a chain of title. San Diego Ga. Co. v. Frame
(1902) 137 Cal. 441, 70 Pac. 295; Ferguson Fruit and Land Co. v. Goodding
(1927) 44 Idaho 76, 258 Pac. 557; Reynolds v. Grand Lodge (1930) 171
La. 395, 131 So. 186.
21 Ballantine, op. cit. 91; note (1922) 7 MINN. L. REV. 42; (1926) 14 CAL.
L. REV. 486.
22 Gardner v. Minneapolis Ry. Co. (1898) 73 Minn. 517, 76 N. W. 282;
Casey v. Galli (1876) 94 U. S. 673.
23 Georgia Fert. Co. v. Foster (1929) 40 Ga. App. 436, 149 S. E. 812;
Northwest Auto Co. v. Harmon (C. C. A. 9, 1918) 250 F. 832; Dugan v.
Int. Ass'n (1917) 202 Ill. App. 308; Pilliod v. Angola R. Co. v. Woods
(1919) 104 Kan. 729, 180 Pac. 734; Beal v. Bass (1894) 86 Me. 325, 29 Atl.
1088; Gilligan v. Gilligan Co. (1913) 94 Neb. 437, 143 N. W. 457; Joint
Stock Co. v. Nat'l City Bank (1924) 210 App. Div. 665, 206 N. Y. S. 476;
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The second class of cases does not involve a true estoppel.
If the pseudo-corporation sues upon a contract made with it the
defendant should not be able to set up defects in the corporate
structure to avoid liability.24 He has made a contract and has
involved himself in a liability which would otherwise attach and
to force the suit to be brought jointly by the members would do
violence to the spirit of simplified procedure. In the field of con-
tract law the courts find no difficulty in raising implied obliga-
tions under quasi-contracts. So there should be little hesitancy
to imply a condition in the dealings under these cases to the ef-
fect that the obligee shall be considered a corporation for the
purposes of the contract.25 Whether the result is reached on
this substantive basis or upon the estoppel basis matters little
since it is the ultimate result that must finally indicate the atti-
tude of the court regardless of its language.26
The third class of cases presents the greatest difficulty. In the
situation where a plaintiff tries to secure personal liability upon
Burke v. Barnum (1917) 40 R. L 71, Atl. 1027; Shields v. Clifton Land
Ass'n (1894) 94 Tenn. 143, 28 S. W. 668; Martin v. South Salem Land Co.
(1897) 94 Va. 28, 26 S. E. 591; McCullough v. Tallageda Ins. Co. (1871)
46 Ala. 376; Scheufler v. Grand Lodge (1891) 45 Minn. 256, 47 N. W. 799;
Grand Co. v. Rollins (1889) 13 Colo. 4, 21 Pac. 897; Stewart Paper Mfg.
Co. v. Rau (1893) 92 Ga. 511, 17 S. E. 748; Fitzpatrick v. Rutter (1896)
160 Il. 282, 43 N. E. 392; Grand Lodge v. Cramer (1895) 60 Ill. App. 212;
Humphrey v. Mercantile Ass'n (1879) 50 Iowa 607; Dooley v. Cheshire
Glass Co. (1860) 81 Mass. 494; Rush v. Halcyon Steamboat Co. (1888) 84
N. Car. 702; Williams v. Stevens Point Lumber Co. (1888) 72 Wis. 487, 40
N, W. 154.
24 City of Greenville v. Greenville Water Works (1899) 125 Ala. 625, 27
So. 764; Plummer v. Struby Estabrooke Merc. Co. (1896) 23 Colo. 190;
Ryan v. Martin (1884) 91 N. Car. 464; Lorillard v. Van Houten (N. J. 1829)
5 Halst. 270; Johnston Harvester Co. v. Clark (1883) 15 N. W. 252,
30 Minn. 308; Chapman v. Colby (1881) 10 N. E. 74; Williamsburg Ins.
Co. (1877) 122 Mass. 391; Williams v. Cheney (Mass. 1855) 3 Gray 215;
Brown v. Scottish Amer. Mortgage Co. (1884) 110 Ill. 235; Gaines v. Bank
of Miss. (1851) 12 Ark. 769; Montgomery R. R. Co. v. Hurst (1846) 9 Ala.
513; Toledo Scale Co. v. Young (1909) 16 Idaho 187, 101 Pac. 257; New
Idea Spreader Co. v. Satterfield (1928) 45 Idaho 753, 265 Pac. 664; Smith
v. Pittler (1928) 95 Cal. App. 101, 272 Pac. 789; Burrows Shoe Co. v.
Brotherton (1930) 106 Cal. App. 162, 288 Pac. 879; Erskine Motor v.
Chevrolet Motor (1920) 180 N. Car. 619, 105 S. E. 420. A contrary view is
held in Welland Canal Co. v. Hathaway (N. Y. 1832) 8 Wend. 480, which
denies the rule in Dutchess Mfg. v. Davis (1817) 14 Johns. (N. Y.) 239, but
it seems that the Welland case has in effect been overruled by Comm. Nat'l
Bank v. Pfeiffer (1888) 108 N. Y. 242, 15 N. E. 701.
25 Tulane Imp. Co. v. Chapman & Co. (1911) 129 La. 562, 56 So. 509;
Braswell v. Scott Lumber Co. (1911) 128 La. 818, 55 So. 468.
-' See Ballantine's comment on Snider Sons v. Troy (1890) 91 Ala. 224,
8 So. 658, op. cit. 93, n. 62.
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a pseudo-corporation's obligation, the courts have varied widely
in result. The writers are at odds in deciding on what side of
the scale rests the weight of authority.-2 It is difficult to esti-
mate accurately just what is the majority rule because many
of the cases present a woeful confusion of ideas and an appalling-
ly loose choice of term. Furthermore there is not always a careful
discrimination between the three classes of so-called "corporation
by estoppel" cases in the citation of the decisions. However, there
are many opinions which impose individual liability.28 It is prob-
ably safe to say that jn point of numbers this group predominates.
On the other hand there is respectable authority for the contrary
proposition. 29 But there is by no means, a uniformity as to the
theories upon which the cases in either group proceed. Harrill
v. Davis3o flatly decides upon grounds of public policy that mem-
27 Dodd, Partnership Liability of Stockholders in Defective Corporations
(1927) 40 HARV. L. REv. 521, claims a weight of authority for the impo-
sition of liability. With him stand Professor Warren, op. cit., Wrighting-
ton, UNINCORPORATED AssocruTioNs (1923) 26, Professor Burdick, Are Un-
incorporated Associations Partnerships? (1906) 6 COL. L. REv. 1, and
Professor Ballantine, op. cit. But Professor Lewisohn, Professor Carpen-
ter, Mr. Fletcher, and Mr. Morawetz align themselves on the opposite side,
while Professor Magruder, as a conscientious objector, remains noncom-
mittal.
28Harrill v. Davis (C. C. A. 8, 1909) 168 F. 187; In re Ballard (D. C. N.
D. Tex. 1922) 279 F. 574; Tucillo v. Petelle (1911) 127 N. Y. S. 314; Jones
v. Aspen Hdwe. Co. (1895) 21 Colo. 263; Martin v. Fewell (1883) 79 Mo.
401; Johnson v. Corser (1885) 34 Minn. 355, 25 N. W. 799; Fay v. Noble
(Mass. 1851) 7 Cush. 188; Bates v. Baker-Street Shirt Co. (C. C. A. 1,
1925) 6 F. (2d) 854; Bigelow v. Gregory (1874) 73 Ill. 197; Guckert v.
Hacke (1893) 158 Pa. St. 303, 28 Atl. 245; Kaiser v. Savings Bank (1881)
56 Iowa 104, 8 N. W. 772; Diehe v. Taylor (1896) 37 Fla. 64, 19 So. 172;
Winfield v. Truitt, 71 Fla. 38, 70 So. 775 (1916) ; Hall v. Robertson (1920)
213 Ill. App. 147; Jennings v. Dark (1910) 175 Ind. 332, 92 N. E. 778;
Central Nat'l Say. Bank v. Sheldon (1912) 86 Kan. 460, 121 Pac. 340; Mc-
Clennan v. Hopkins (1895) 2 Kan. App. 260, 41 Pac. 1061; Smith v. Shoodoe
Pond Packing Co. (1912) 109 Me. 555, 84 Atl. 268; Finnegan v. Noeren-
berg (1893) 52 Minn. 239, 53 N. W. 1150; Abbott v. Omaha S. & R. Co.(1876) 4 Neb. 416; Poergeron v. Hobbs (1897) 96 Wis. 641, 71 N. W. 1056.
'
5 In re Western Bank & T. Co. (1908) 163 F. 713; First Nat'l Bank of
Ocean City v. Zelley (N. J. 1930) 150 Atl. 413; Humphrey v. Mooney (1880)
5 Colo. 282; Blanchard v. Kaull (1872) 44 Cal. 440; American Rad. Co. v.
Kinnear (1909) 56 Wash. 510, 105 Pac. 630; Braswell v. Scott Lum. Co.(1911) 128 La. 818, 55 So. 468; Tulane Imp. Co. v. Chapman & Co. (1911) 129
La. 562, 56 So. 509; Slocum v. Head (1900) 105 Wis. 439, 81 N. W. 673;
Pittsburg Co. v. Beale (1902) 204 Pa. 53 Atl. 540; Lockwood v. Wynkoop
(1914) 178 Mich. 388, 144 N. W. 846 (dictum); Magnolia Shingle Co. v.
Zimmerins Co. (1912) 3 Ala. App. 578, 58 So. 90; Stafford Bank v. Palmer
(1880) 47 Conn. 443; John Bernhardt's Estate (1924) 156 La. 207, 100 So.
399; Booth v. Scott (1918) 276 Mo. 1, 205 S. W. 635.
30 N. 28 above.
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bers of an association less than de facto must be liable as part-
ners. Fay v. Noble31 hedges a bit and imposes personal liability
upon the active members but relieves from such liability the in-
active members. The court argues that the acts done by the
representatives in behalf of the organization are acts of agency,
but since the inactive members who do not serve as representa-
tives have not authorized the creation of personal liability for
themselves and since the organization, being fatally defective, is
not a legal entity, there is no principal and, quod erat demon-
strandum, the active members must be liable on the doctrine of
Younge v. Toynbee.32 This logic is open to the objections that it
is not at all foreign to the law of agency to impose liability upon
the principal despite the absence of authority and that Younge
v. Toynbee is not unquestioned law, especially in so far as it
enunciates principles of policy. In Tulane Implement Co. v. S. A.
Chapman & Co. 33 and in Stayer & Abbott Mfg. Co. v. Blake34
non-partnership liability is achieved by means of an implied
contract. When the defendants contracted with the plaintiff
there was an implied condition by reason of their very use of a
corporate appearance that only the limited liability of a cor-
porate organization was being subjected to the obligation. The
case of In re Western Bank 35 emphasizes the capacity in which
the group has acted, holding that creditors who have treated
with the corporation as such cannot hold the members indi-
vidually even though there is no de facto existence. In several
cases the plaintiff brought a prior action against the corporation
as an entity and now seeks to collect his judgment (rendered
against the corporation) from the members but he has not been
permitted to do so.36 The decision in Braswell v. Scott Lumber
Co.3 7 proceeds from a reluctance to set up a contract of which
neither party was cognizant at the time of their dealings.
Whereas, in Snider & Sons v. Troy,38 the court seizes upon all
the possible theories with equal avidity and relish for each in
31 Ibid.
a2 (1910) 1 K. B. 215, holds that an agent contracting for a non-existent
principal is himself liable although the death of the principal is unknown
to him. Also Collen v. Wright (1874) 8 El. & BI. 647.
as N. 29 above.
34 (1896) 111 Mich. 282, 69 N. W. 508; Snider's Sons v. Troy (1890) 91
Ala. 224, 8 So. 658; Blanchard v. Kaull, n. 29 above; Planters & Miners
Bank v. Padgett (1882) 69 Ga. 159; Miller v. Coal Co. (1888) 31 W. Va.
836, 8 S. E. 600; Sentell v. J. E. Hewitt et al. (1898) 50 La. Ann. 3, 22 So.
970; Wesco Supply Co. v. Smith (1918) 134 Ark. 23, 203 S. W. 6.
35 N. 29 above.
36 Ibid.
ST Ibid.
38 N. 34 above and see n. 26.
Washington University Open Scholarship
ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
turn, and finally concludes that the association involved is a de
facto organization after all.
Nor is there any harmony among the text-writers as to the
appropriate theoretical basis upon which the cases may be re-
solved. Professor Warren contends8 9 that the associates in' a
defectively organized corporation which has not measured up to
de facto requirements should be held liable as partners. "The
contention that out of a consensual transaction no obligation
can arise except such as the parties intended to arise is not
sound. The law frequently imposes upon the parties to a con-
sensual transaction certain obligations not covered by their
actual expressed intent. Thus A, owner of a tract of land, may
convey a portion of it to B and A may find that the law imposes
an easement for B over the land retained although he had no
intent that B should have such an easement. Thus A may sell
goods to B and find that the law imposes upon him a warranty
of their quality although he had no intent to make such a war-
ranty. Then A may without authority assume as agent of B to
contract with C and may find that the law imposes upon him
personally a liability under the contract." He further suggests
that collateral attack be liberally permitted. But it may be sug-
gested in answer to such arguments that ways of necessity and
warranties are implied out of the presumed intent of the parties,
and such presumptions may be expressly negatived in the trans-
action. Is it not a fair assumption to say that the intent which
may be presumed from a transaction involving a purported cor-
poration is that the limited corporate liability is being extended
by the obligor and being accepted by the obligee? This, of
course, involves the proposition that to invoke successfully the
estoppel doctrine there must be a clear holding out of the cor-
poration by the obligors and a recognition of the group as such
by the obligees.40 Professor Carpenter 41 advocates the contrary
view, as does Professor Lewisohn. 42 It is Professor Carpenter's
contention that the nature of stockholders' liability is limited
and, in the absence of considerations of public policy, a corporate
result should be reached no matter how defective the organiza-
tion may be. Turning to those elements of policy which may de-
feat this conclusion he sees no real reason based on policy where-
by to hold the stockholder. "The only substantial objection to
treating the insufficiently incorporated association as a corpora-
39 Warren, Collateral Attack (1907) 21 HARV. L. REV. 312.
40 Slocum v. Head; American Rad. Co. v. Kinnear; n. 29 above.
41 Carpenter, Are Stockholders of Defective Corporations Liable as Part-
ners? (1923) 8 MiNN. L. REv. 409.
42 Lewisohn, Liability of Associates in Defectively Incorporated Associa-
tions (1915) 13 MiCH. L. Rsv. 271.
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tion is the possibility of fraud and imposition upon the persons
who have dealt with it. . . Subject to safeguard against the
abuse of immunity from individual liability, persons should be
as free to associate themselves into corporations by contract as
to form partnerships." However, the fact which seems to have
escaped Professor Carpenter's notice is that the courts, by a
denial of corporate existence where the de facto requisites have
not been met, are attempting to create that very safeguard
against abuse of limited liability of which he speaks.
Professor Dodd43 in an illuminating article contends very
vigorously that the "less than de facto corporation" must be
considered a partnership and he attempts to prove his point
upon the basis of the principles of the Uniform Partnership
Acts. But Professor Magruder 44 with equal vigor refutes the
contention. So, with the academicians in the field of Corpora-
tions disowning this type of business group and the scholastics
in the field of Partnerships denying its rightful presence in'their
preserves, the unfortunate legal waif finds meagre welcome. In
fact one is reminded of the lines in one of Countee Cullen's
"Epitaphs."
... poor soul..
God and Satan are arguing
Which shall take you, which repel,
God wants no discord in his Heaven,
And Satan has enough in Hell."
In endeavoring to arrive at a workable rule by which the
problem of liability of a fatally defective organization may be
resolved, a common sense approach will indicate several factors
of which account must be taken. The corporation with its limi-
tation of personal liability is one of the economic institutions to
which a great deal of the progress and advancement of our
present day capitalistic system may be attributed. Investors
do not want to subject their whole fortunes to the exploitation of
a new venture. Furthermore creditors are not unfamiliar with
the type of liability to which they may have resort when they
deal with a business group that purports to be a corporation. If
we are to say that associates who hold themselves out as a cor-
poration are estopped to deny that corporate existence, we there-
by permit the creditor to get at the group assets despite the de-
fectiveness of its incorporation. In this event the creditor is faced
with the problem of determining the value of the credit of the
group and the extent to which their group assets can bear the
4- Dodd, Stockholders in Defective Corporations (1927) 40 HAnv. L. REV.
521.
"Magruder, Partnership Liability of Stockholders in Defective Corpora-
tions (1927) 40 H~Av. L. Rnv. 733.
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burden of the obligation which he may thrust upon them. It is
submitted that this is no more or less than any creditor must do
to protect himself in dealing with any debtor. The statement of
Judge Brewer, in Gartside Coat Co. v. Maxwell, is pregnant with
good sense. "I think the true rule to be this: that where per-
sons knowingly and fraudulently assume a corporate existence,
or pretend to have a corporate existence, they can be held liable
as individuals; but where they are acting in good faith . . .
and where the corporation assumes to transact business for a
series of years and the assumed corporate existence is not chal-
lenged by the state, then they cannot be held liable as partners."
It is therefore submitted that a denial of corporate existence
should not be permitted for the purpose of imposing partnership
liability on stockholderi in respect to contractual claims no mat-
ter how fatal the defect in the corporate organization where
there has been a formation of an association as a corporation
in good faith and for a legitimate business enterprise, provided
that the pseudo-corporation clearly purports to be a corporation
and that the party dealing with it cannot show that for valid
reasons, he did not deal with it as such.
Such a rule will lead to no injustice towards the creditor be-
cause he can inspect the credit of the group with which he
deals, and furthermore it will obviate a contrary doctrine which
is harsh, unjust, and discordant with sound economic considera-
tions.
A. W. PETCHAFT, '33.
WHAT REMARKS BY A LAWYER IN HIS OPENING
STATEMENT ARE PREJUDICIAL?
Procedural law does not normally present such an interesting
field for debate on conflicting views as does substantive law.
But the state of the law on such a question as, what remarks by
counsel in his opening statement will be prejudicial, is often of
far more practical importance to a lawyer than the status of
some question of substantive law, because a particular question
of substantive law may not arise in more than one of a thousand
cases while the trial of every case before a jury includes an
opening statement by each party which may make a lasting im-
pression on the jury. The cases dealing with the problem evince
a notable absence of clear thinking, precise terminology and
consistent application of principles to similar fact-situations.
Textbooks dealing with the subject of trials generally enunciate
the proposition that the opening statement of counsel should
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